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At the about the same time that researchers in languages and linguistics began to turn 
their attention to the systematic and critical study of political aspects of language (e.g. 
Fowler et. al., 1979) researchers in political theory were, in various ways, focusing on 
the language of politics. Some took their cue from the philosophy of the later Witt-
genstein and also from J.L. Austin (e.g. Skinner, 1988; Pocock, 1971; Connolly, 
1974) while others looked to continental structuralist and poststructuralist theories 
(e.g. Shapiro, 1981; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; for an overview see Norval 2000). In 
political science, researchers from quite different traditions similarly began finding 
language a useful way into examining, understanding and assessing phenomena such 
as policy agendas, political deliberation and decision-making. There has since been an 
ever greater convergence between the work of politics specialists studying language 
and that of language specialists studying politics. In my own research – into the theo-
ry and history of ideologies – I have been very much influenced and inspired by the 
work of scholars such as Norman Fairclough, Teun Van Dijk and Ruth Wodak.  
 
There is, without doubt, much to be gained from the sharing of ideas, methods and 
findings between Politics and Language specialists. However, there are also signifi-
cant differences in the approaches, objects and goals of those coming from a back-
ground in language studies compared to those coming from political studies. If inter-
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disciplinary research is to be as valuable as it might be then, I believe, these differ-
ences should not be minimised. We gain most when the distinctive flavours of our 
fields are retained and appreciated rather than lost through indiscriminate blending. 
Accordingly, in this chapter I want to emphasise what I think is specific about my ap-
proach to political language and perhaps different when compared to that of col-
leagues working in languages. In some respects such differences are to do with em-
phasis: scholars of language and linguistics might tend to see politics as providing 
good and especially important examples of some things that can be done with lan-
guage; political theorists might tend to see language as a good and important example 
of politics. But this difference of emphasis can also be substantive.  
 
I come to the study of language in politics not only because of an appreciation of the 
importance of the ways in which power is exercised through language. I come to it 
because I am trying to understand something about what it is we are doing when we 
think about and ‘do’ politics (and about how to do both well). My ‘research questions’ 
fundamentally concern ideology - in the broadest (and least pejorative) sense; I am 
interested in how people think their politics, what determines that thinking and what 
is determined by it. As Stuart Hall put it: ‘The problem of ideology…concerns the 
ways in which ideas of different kinds grip the minds of masses and thereby become a 
“material force”’. A goal of analysis is to understand ‘how a particular set of ideas 
comes to dominate the social thinking’ uniting particular economic and political 
groups, helping them to maintain their leadership of society as a whole. And in study-
ing all this, Hall argued, we are especially concerned with ‘the concepts and the lan-
guages of practical thought…[and]...with the processes by which new forms of con-
sciousness, new conceptions of the world arise…’ (Hall, 1996: 26). I am, then, inter-
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ested first and foremost in ideas and in concepts - their histories, form, function and 
effects. And because these are formed from and made known by language I am inter-
ested in that too.  
 
Study of the conceptual languages of politics and ideology can be purely scholastic; it 
is a history of ideas akin to a history of science or a history of art. But it also has its 
critical aspect. That may include exposure of the hidden power behind political lan-
guage. But it is not only that. Politics almost always involves people drawing on, for-
mulating, reformulating, expressing and assessing the languages of politics in order to 
make something happen - or to stop it from happening. In showing how this has taken 
place in some particular instance one hopes to make it available for judgement by 
others and to enable them to learn from it in ways which enhance their capacity to do 
it for themselves. I am, then, interested in the ways in which language may support 
systems of domination but also – importantly – in how language and ideology may be 
used as part of critique and resistance.  
 
What I want to do in this chapter – before talking about Cameron’s Bloomberg speech 
– is to take the opportunity to explain to friends and colleagues in languages and lin-
guistics a little more about this sort of approach. I will do that by outlining the back-
ground to the ways in which some of us in Political Studies look at language,  empha-
sising interest in linguistic-conceptual novelty. I will then turn to ‘Rhetorical Political 
Analysis’ (RPA). This is not (yet) a ‘school’ or an established ‘method’ of the scale 
and sophistication of, say, Critical Discourse Analysis. It is a more general way of 
thinking about the words and associated performances of politics and political actors 
(see, for example, Atkins et.al., 2014; Atkins and Finlayson, 2016; Crines et. al., 
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2016; Finlayson, 2007; 2014; Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Martin, 2015; 2016). 
While it has connections to research into policy discourse and also political theories 
of deliberation, RPA is best thought of as part of what Michael Freeden (2015) calls 
the ‘political theory of political thinking’ since it is especially interested in political 
concepts – with how they are formed in and through language, how they are dissemi-
nated, and the conditions under which they may ‘grip’ people and become part of a 
historically effective, transformative political force. Understanding that requires iden-
tification of the ways in which such concepts are parts of larger arguments, and of 
how they may be not only tools of politics but political forces themselves, driving po-
litical thinking, arguing and acting down particular tracks. Finally, I will turn to look 
– rather briefly – at Cameron’s speech in order to illustrate just some aspects of RPA. 
In my reading I will concentrate on the concept of “Britishness” and how it forms a 
premise within Cameron's arguments. Doubtless much of what I say will be familiar 
to those working within languages and linguistics but perhaps my presentation of 
things within the context of political theory will illuminate differences in ways that 
enable further edifying conversation between our fields.  
 
Approaches and Schools  
 
There is a wide range of approaches to the study of political language within Political 
Studies. Some of these are quantitative, using the analysis of a large body of texts as a 
way of measuring some feature or aspect of politics. For example, Laver et. al. (2002) 
propose that words be used as pure data to enable the specification of policy positions. 
This approach has been particularly extensively applied as part of a large project col-
lating and comparing party manifestos (see https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/). Such 
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research tends to be concerned primarily with establishing underlying general princi-
ples or rules of politics (for example relating to changes in policy positions) and lan-
guage is used as a proxy.  
 
In contrast, the influential policy scientist Giandomenico Majone has stressed that 
‘politicians know only too well but social scientists too often forget, public policy is 
made of language’ (1989: 1). Policy processes, he argues, are shaped not only by cal-
culations of self-interest but also by the need to justify things to others, to explain and 
persuade. In studying such persuasion policy scientists have not been confined to 
quantitative analysis; they have drawn on a wider literature concerned with organisa-
tions and organisational culture as they have sought to explain and explore the para-
digms that shape policy thinking, the narratives, performances and kinds of argumen-
tation within and through which they are made and then articulated to others (see, for 
example, Bevir and Rhodes, 2007; Fischer and Gottweis, 2012; Hajer, 1997; Hall, 
1993; Schmidt, 2008). Such research often draws on terms and tools found in CDA 
(see Fairclough, 2013) but also on Foucauldian scholarship (e.g. Bacchi, 2009).  
 
A third example of Politics scholars’ interest in language comes from political theory. 
Here there is a very well established tradition of deliberative political theory con-
cerned with normative assessments of the quality or justice of deliberation. The focus 
here may not be on the details of the actual language used but, rather, on the proce-
dures and processes of argument and debate, with a view to devising rules and ways 
of evaluating their application so as to ensure that politics conforms to principles of 
fairness, reason and equality (e.g. Dryzek, 2002; 2010). 
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A different set of approaches comes from those influenced by Wittgensteinian think-
ing. A particularly important concept here is, unsurprisingly, that of ‘language 
games’. Its importance for political theory lies in the way in which it forces us to turn 
our attention away from what we might like to think are underlying laws of politics, 
or overarching ahistorical values governing it, and to look instead at what people are 
doing when they do the things we think of as politics or as political. That makes us 
see political statements and the use of political concepts as parts of wider and ongoing 
practical activities. Consequently the task of political theory, as James Tully argues, 
stops being that of ‘discovering a general and comprehensive rule and then applying it 
to particular cases’ but rather one of exploring a practical capacity to use terms in giv-
en circumstances - ‘to give reasons for and against this or that use…’ as well as to ‘go 
against customary uses, in actual cases’ (Tully, 2002: 543). Here, analysis might con-
cern itself with the ‘grammar’ of politics – that which ‘delimits what may count as 
possible descriptions of how things are’ (Norval, 2007: 106) - and also with how 
those grammars change in and through their use, through rational argumentation and 
also through ‘showing’ by means of analogy, metaphor and other figurative language.  
 
The concept of ‘language games’ thus enables the theoretical analysis of politics to 
ask a number of crucial questions: what are the varied language games of political 
action?; what are their ‘rules’ and characteristics?; when distinct games challenge or 
contradict each other how do they attempt to maintain integrity?; how are alternatives 
excluded or accommodated?; what affects capacity to exclude or accommodate? Cru-
cially, these questions give rise to a concern with practices of contestation and decon-
testation of meaning (see  Freeden, 1998; 2004).   
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Conceptual History  
 
How is it that complex and perhaps open concepts (say, ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’ or 
‘Englishness’) come to have certain sorts of meanings, giving them potential for cer-
tain sorts of effects, and how is that meaning maintained or defended, challenged and 
changed? To put that another way, how are some meanings decontested, put seeming-
ly beyond the reach of criticism, and how are those meanings contested and perhaps 
overturned? One important approach to answering such questions originated in meth-
odological debates within the historical study of political thought.  
 
It might be thought that the purpose of historical research into political thought is to 
uncover, illuminate and celebrate a tradition, or to uncover the pure rational core of 
past thoughts, to strip them of the contingent features of their time, translate them into 
a more rigorous analytical form and then test their applicability in the present. In the 
late 1960s and into the 1970s an alternative proposition was made: that the history of 
political thought is a history of ideas and as such a history of ‘acts of speech’ and of 
‘the condition or contexts in which these acts were performed’. For J.G.A. Pocock the 
goal of such research was to identify institutionalised modes of speech and their 
change over time. Political theory, he suggested, studies ‘sub-languages, rhetorics, 
ways of talking about politics, distinguishable language-games’, their ‘vocabulary, 
rules, preconditions, implications and style’ (1987: 21).   
 
Studying this mattered for Politics, Pocock argued, because verbalizations are – of 
course – ‘acts of power’. By informing people of something we may alter their per-
ceptions; by defining people we may alter how they are perceived by others or, in-
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deed, by themselves (1973: 30). But such acts of power are themselves also acted on – 
to work they must make use of and be part of an already instituted world of speech 
acts. As Pocock put it: ‘Each of us speaks with many voices, like a tribal shaman in 
whom the ancestor ghosts are all talking at once; when we speak, we are not sure who 
is talking or what is being said, and our acts of power in communication are not whol-
ly our own’. One of the purposes of political theory is to try and show ‘what power is 
being exercised over us when we seek to exercise it’ (1973: 31) but also to pursue the 
implications of the fact that the power we have in using language is a one we cannot 
fully control or keep from others; it opens a space within which disputation and con-
testation can take place.  
 
The ambiguity and instability of language is – from this point of view – productive. 
As Pocock put it: ‘If I can discern unexpected possibilities in your language, you can 
discern others in mine; if I can perform in unexpected fashion the roles which lan-
guage thrusts upon me, you can perform in ways I do not anticipate the roles which I 
am thrusting upon you’ (1973: 43). It is a point made more recently by Jacques 
Ranciere who finds in language an implication of equality in the form of a shared ca-
pacity to understand and to act in and on speech. That capacity might be obscured or 
suppressed by institutionalized and well-policed rules and orders of speaking. Ranci-
ere coins the term ‘literarity’ to refer to the instability and malleability of language 
which makes it possible to resist such an ordering of speaking beings. Echoing but 
also critically extending Aristotle he claims that we are political animals ‘for two rea-
sons…first, because we have the power to put into circulation more words, "useless" 
and unnecessary words, words that exceed the function of rigid designation; secondly, 
because this fundamental ability to proliferate words is unceasingly contested by 
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those who claim to "speak correctly" - that is, by the masters of designation and clas-
sification who, by virtue of wanting to retain their status and power, flat-out deny this 
capacity to speak’ (see Panagia, 2009). 
 
Within the History of Political Thought investigation into the relationship between 
institutionalised, generic forms of thinking and communication and the novel uses 
that change the game (adding to the vocabulary, employing new tones or styles) has 
been particularly well developed by Quentin Skinner. Locating works within their his-
torical moment, including the available forms and genres, he has come to understand 
political thoughts ‘through the uses they are put to in argument’, examining concepts 
as ‘tools and weapons of ideological debate’ (Skinner, 2002a: 176). For example, he 
has been especially interested in the trope of paradiastole the redescription of an ac-
tion, person or phenomenon so that it is shifted from one moral category to another – 
as when we say that someone is not thrifty but mean. Skinner is interested in the ways 
in which the evaluative force of terms is altered over time in part because of the work 
of those he calls ‘innovating ideologists’.  
 
Part of Skinner’s achievement here has been to help us see political theorists as also a 
kind of political actor. Inspired by this insight the Finnish political theorist and con-
ceptual historian Kari Palonen has argued that we should not only see political theo-
rists as politicians but also see politicians as political theorists. We should, he argues, 
‘renounce our widespread academic contempt for politicians’ and take seriously their 
acting, speaking and thinking. ‘Politicians’ here might mean all kinds of political ac-
tor – street activists, policy wonks or prime ministers. Palonen’s proposition is not 
that we simply accept or unthinkingly admire what these people do but that we exam-
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ine how they form and express their thinking, drawing on extant vocabularies and us-
ing them as part of ongoing political action. We should, says Palonen, make the per-
formances of politicians a distinct object of investigation, examining how they inter-
pret their situation, assessing their ‘contestational imagination’ and asking questions 
concerning ‘how they act when they act politically…how they take a stand, or justify 
or explicate a certain standpoint’ (Palonen, 2005: 8). A related approach has been pi-
oneered by Michael Freeden (1998) who has made the history of contestation and de-
contestation within political ideologies into a distinct object of study. Drawing on 
Skinner, Palonen, Freeden and others I have elsewhere characterised this as a study of 
‘political theory in the wild’ (Finlayson, 2012).   
 
Research into the historical languages of political thought, then, demonstrates how 
change in the use of political concepts is a fundamental dimension of political action 
and political history. This links it to a third important set of ideas associated with 
Gramscian Marxism and post-Marxism. In addition to Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau has 
been extremely important here. His thinking is explicitly indebted to Wittgenstein and 
is similarly concerned with uses of language in political life, with how meanings are 
formed, decontested and then contested and reformed. Stabilisation in meaning is un-
derstood by Laclau in terms of ‘hegemony’, the establishment and maintenance of 
discourses particularly through the operations of ‘articulation’ – the combining of 
concepts in ways that modify the meanings of each – and ‘antagonism’, the constitu-
tion of an ‘outside’ or ‘other’ against which a discourse defines itself. In his later 
works Laclau became especially interested in the rhetorical (in the sense of figurative) 
aspects of political discourse and especially the trope of catachresis - the imposition 
of a ‘proper’ name onto something that does not have one. This is often associated 
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with ‘impropriety’, because it involves giving a name with no grounds for doing so. 
The name does not follow from a linguistic, philosophical or poetic necessity and 
cannot be ‘converted’ back into a literal term yet it is necessary since without it there 
is no name. It is contingent (non-necessary) but once present is an element necessary 
for the structuring of a particular argumentative discourse. Indeed, Laclau claims that 
the trope of catachresis is the ‘common denominator of rhetoricity as such’ (2005: 
71). 
 
The different approaches I have looked at here, from conceptual history to discourse 
theory, converge at the point where they are concerned with conceptual contestation 
and decontestation. In differing ways they suggest that a fundamental if not exclusive 
dimension of political action is conceptual; the production of claims and names in the 
process of affirming or subverting an institutionalised structure of political discourse 
and political thinking. The way in which they approach research into this has, I think, 
an important emphasis different from that found in some other critical analyses of po-
litical language and discourse. Political analysts and theorists are, as we have seen, 
aware of the ways in which governments and bureaucracies and media systems are 
conditioned by explicit and implicit social rules that sometimes work behind the 
backs of subjects. And we are all interested in the ways in which social forces are uni-
fied, contained, legitimated and naturalised. However, where, some analysts might 
emphasise the successful reproduction of these systems the tendency in the kinds of 
political theory I am describing is to focus on failure: on the incapacity of a discourse 
to reproduce itself be it due to the absence of a name for something, the possibility for 
a new name or the way in which a name may be construed in unexpected ways. With 
this clear focus on how institutionalised and dominant discourses are forced to defend 
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or repair themselves, and on how novelty or interruption comes about and the condi-
tions in which it succeeds, we can now turn to Rhetoric.   
 
Rhetorical Political Analysis  
 
Rhetorical Political Analysis draws on concepts and terms from the rhetorical tradi-
tion in order to identify and interpret how actors employ concepts in making various 
kinds of argument. It is interested in how actors seek to repair ideological discourses, 
or defend them from the counterclaims of others. It is also – and perhaps especially – 
interested in how they try to adapt or rearticulate vocabularies and repertoires of 
commonplaces, developing new kinds of claim or subverting and redescribing old 
ones. That includes the creative ways in which actors might communicate across lan-
guage games or ideological discourses.  
 
In outline such analysis might begin with the theoretical as well as empirical investi-
gation of the historically evolved (and evolving) ‘platforms’ on and through which 
political actors make their case. Particular polities constitute such stages sometimes 
informally and sometimes through constitutional rules. The Parliamentary despatch 
box, the conference speech, the monarchical address, the press conference, the TV 
interview, the televised debate (and the mass demonstration) are all particular ways of 
bringing together a speaker and an audience. Each of these stages is connected with 
more or less rigid generic rules, implicit and explicit, which shape what audiences ex-
pect and what speakers must do. Such occasions certainly are an opportunity for 
speakers to exercise power over others but they are also tests of competence; occa-
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sions at which political actors are obliged to present themselves and be available for 
public judgement (see also Finlayson, 2015; Green, 2009).  
 
What happens on that platform is always a specific speech action linked to what 
Lloyd Bitzer ((1999[1968]) called an ‘exigence’: a problem or issue, a thing to be 
done or changed. That exigence does not fully determine what is attempted – let alone 
what is achieved – and part of any political or rhetorical situation is what those in-
volve construe the situation to be. Consequently the situation may include within it 
parts of the history of ways of thinking about the issues under consideration – past 
debates about welfare or warfare, traditions of thinking and arguing about equality or 
fairness. The concept of ‘rhetorical situation’ and of ‘exigence’ thus focuses our atten-
tion on the particularity of the moments in which rhetoric occurs; it reminds us to hes-
itate before subsuming such situations within more general categories. From the rhe-
torical perspective such situations are always unique and temporary configurations; 
skilled rhetoricians are aware that their action is bound to its moment and alert to the 
brief opportunities when one might reorder things and open up a new situation. In this 
respect the central ‘research question’ of RPA draws directly from Aristotle; we ask 
what were the available means of persuasion in particular situations, and how were 
they put to use (why and with what outcomes?).   
 
Having identified this sort of context (the stage, the problem, the sedimented dis-
course about a particular issue) RPA attends – in classical vein – to the proofs or ap-
peals within a discourse. The appeal to ethos involves the construction and perfor-
mance of an identity or persona as a way of securing grounds for being attended to 
and perhaps also authority for certain claims. That may involve appeals to formal au-
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thorities, respected sources, admired people and texts; it also – very importantly – in-
cludes the implied character of the audience for the discourse. Rhetorical appeals of-
ten involve a ‘promise’ as to who we will be when whatever course of action the rhe-
torician proposes has been undertaken; they are always a kind of invitation to agree 
and in so doing to become the sort of people who would agree. Here agreement is also 
assumption of an identity and of an orientation to the issues at hand. Such appeals 
connect directly with emotions. Through subject matter, choice of words, ways of nar-
rating or describing events as well as through tone and style, rhetoric can respond to 
or induce the affective context within which we apprehend the things around us – be it 
with sympathy, pity, love, horror, loathing or anger (see Martin, 2016).  
 
Finally, and very importantly, rhetoric also involves all sorts of rational or quasi-
rational appeals.  That includes claims about reality: to facts and to what we all accept 
as given. It also includes forms of deduction such as the way examples or descriptions 
of the situation (including figurative descriptions) are made premises in some chain of 
reasoning: that the presence of one thing implies another; that if X happens then Y 
will surely follow; that various phenomena are linked in some way be it within a situ-
ation or across time.  
 
Of importance here is the concept of doxa: common or accepted opinion the use of 
which is, for Aristotle, a definitive feature of rhetoric. Doxa is often considered a 
wholly bad thing. Bourdieu, for example, uses it to name what is taken as granted and 
so put beyond question; it is a manifestation of social power and thus an object of cri-
tique. From the rhetorical point of view that is too rigid a conception of doxa. Doxa is 
not ‘true reason’ although it may contain truths. It is a specific, local and historically 
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developing collection of claims and references, assumptions and cognitive shortcuts, 
ways of thinking and arguing. It is not free of contradiction but at any one moment 
not all of doxa is in play. It is a kind of reservoir of general concepts, claims, explana-
tions and justifications from which people draw when articulating a specific case. It is 
the location of extant relations between ethos and affect as well as modes of deduc-
tion and, because their interplay is variable and unstable, doxa is not simply an en-
closed horizon (conservative though it may be). As Linda Zerilli has written ‘when 
we appeal to the sensus communis, we are not appealing to a fixed set of opinions but 
to what is communicable. Far from guaranteeing agreement in advance, sensus com-
munis allows differences of perspective to emerge and become visible’ (173: 2005). 
Consequently, rhetoric can involve the exercise of an imaginative power, reworking 
the common sense ways in which we apprehend something. Rhetorical moments are a 
chance for audiences to make judgements not only of those making arguments but 
also of the arguments themselves. When these draw on the common sense of that au-
dience it is, in a sense, exercising a judgement over itself, its shared beliefs, expecta-
tions, uses of concepts, and ways in which these might be applied to a present situa-
tion (see also Farrell, 1993).  
 
I think that this draws out some important differences of emphasis in RPA when 
compared to other ways of analysing political discourse. For example, some kinds of 
argumentation theory are primarily concerned to identify forms of reasoning in order 
to assess them with reference to more general criteria of rationality or fairness. There 
is nothing necessarily wrong with that but RPA tends to stress that from the point of 
view of political action the criteria for assessing arguments are always within a rhetor-
ical situation (perhaps even part of what is in dispute). They are never apart from it. 
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Sometimes in order to act politically one has to adapt to whatever those criteria are 
(bearing in mind that uses of argument may and often do become part of future rhetor-
ical situations). One key task of analysis is to identify the shape and structure of such 
reasoning, to trace out its development seeing how concepts enter into and shape po-
litical moments, but this can be forestalled by too great an emphasis on adjudicating 
argument against abstract criteria (on this see the debate between Fairclough and 
Fairclough, 2013; Finlayson, 2013; Hay, 2013; Coleman, 2013).  
 
In a related way Ruth Wodak characterises Critical Discourse Studies with reference 
to ‘common interests in de-mystifying ideologies and power’ (2001: 3). I sympathise 
with the motivations here but worry that too quick a rush to ‘demystify’ ideologies 
and power hinders consideration of their use in transformative political action, privi-
leging a place outside of politics. Wodak says that she aims in her work to ‘produce 
and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves 
from forms of domination through self-reflection…producing enlightenment and 
emancipation…to root out particular kinds of delusion…’ (2001: 7) I would rather 
emphasise the identification of particular sorts of ideological thought-action as a way 
of understanding political moments, increasing ones capacity to act upon them, and 
also of identifying possibilities for rhetorical counter-action (through which people 
may emancipate themselves and each other). For me the important act of critique is 
not the one that takes place in our research - incredibly important as that is - but the 
one which takes place in and as rhetorical political action, intervening into and trans-
forming doxa.  
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There is, however, nothing necessarily antithetical between CDS and RPA. The dif-
ferences between them are the effect (but also the cause) of interest in slightly differ-
ent political moments. CDS is often interested in the routine reproduction of discur-
sive and ideological power which it wants to expose and make available for critique. 
RPA is more interested in the actions made possible by moments of crisis within 
which critique can be enacted. Of course, like politics in general, rhetoric can be put 
to very destructive uses. When that happens the problem is not unscrupulous orators 
but too few skilled ones to challenge them. In combination, CDS and RPA can help 
each other understand present situations and good orators to act within them so as to 
bring about change.   
 
Cameron’s Speech  
 
Let us turn then, all too briefly, to Cameron’s Bloomberg speech which from my 
point of view affords us a way of seeing inside a kind of political thinking. Like all 
speeches it is a complex condensation or crystallisation formed from the flows of 
many different levels and kinds of institutional, historical and conceptual forces and 
tendencies. That includes the overlapping histories of the Conservative Party and of 
British Conservative political thinking and also, at a more specific level, a history of 
British concepts and arguments about the EU. It is also, more broadly, made from a 
history of British political speech styles, genres and platforms. But we must not forget 
that it is a very specific moment of action: an attempt to intervene into these histories 
of which it is also a product. At this sharp end the speech is an element of a particular 
moment. Cameron’s position within the Conservative Party was weak because he had 
failed to win an election in 2010, leading to the formation of an unwelcome coalition 
  18 
with the Liberal Democrat Party. Some on his own side thought Cameron too close to 
his coalition partners and too socially liberal in outlook. In May of 2012 the United 
Kingdom Independence Party experienced a record success in local elections, threat-
ening some marginal Conservative seats. Like many previous Conservative leaders 
without a strong Parliamentary majority Cameron found himself under pressure from 
those in his party hostile to the EU. In June of 2012 he had addressed the issue and 
ruled out an immediate in/out referendum suggesting that there needed to be a clearer 
choice to put to the public. He was hoping to win concessions from the EU and so to 
put something new to them. One-hundred of his MPs called for a referendum. With 
pressure building a policy shift had been expected. Indeed, this speech had been much 
delayed while Cameron and his allies tried to prepare the context.  
 
These are some of the complexities of the exigency: Cameron wanted to counter the 
perception that he was a weak leader; he needed also to reposition himself and his 
party in order to reduce the perceived threat from UKIP; he wanted to shift the con-
text of current British debates about the EU by convincing other EU leaders to grant 
concessions. But – problematically as we shall see – this meant that the speech was 
addressing different audiences to whom it was saying different things: the EU leaders 
to whom it was directly addressed; Eurosceptics and Europhiles within the Conserva-
tive Party; a wider audience within the country including UKIP supporters and others. 
It was an intervention into multiple debates. In developing his strategy Cameron was 
not entirely free to decide how to go about things. He was constrained by the estab-
lished Tory EU ‘language game’ which centred on themes of theft (of sovereignty), 
betrayal (of the nation) and especially of hard-headed, unsentimental and untheoreti-
cal British ‘scepticism’. He had to work with that discourse at the same time as trying 
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to motivate EU leaders to be sympathetic to his cause. A skilled politician and orator 
would be challenged to find a way to achieve all this and might well have sought to 
avoid such a situation. Cameron was not a skilled politician or orator. 
 
The staging of the speech is designed to give Cameron the chance to perform the au-
thority he lacks. This is reflected stylistically in the absence of jokes or ‘grand’ rheto-
ric; the speech does not have a very rousing and emotive peroration to leave the 
crowd applauding. It is primarily concerned with definitions and positioning in rela-
tion to them. But Cameron tries to create a sense of the decisive importance of the 
moment and of his intervention into it, specifically referring to a need for ‘urgency 
and frankness’. He starts the speech by locating it in historical time (seventy years 
since World War Two) and in relation to a number of major political moments and 
processes (war, the establishment of peace, a changing global economy, crises in the 
Eurozone, popular unrest and new challenges to prosperity). But he cannot escape the 
Conservative tradition and, as we shall see, Thatcher haunts the speech very directly.  
 
The historical references (mostly to war and military action) are an attempt to insert 
Cameron and his arguments into a grand sequence of canonical events. They also 
support a claim that the EU is a historical achievement rather than a natural outcome. 
Peace ‘did not happen like a change in the weather’ but because of ‘determined work 
over the generations’ (a point further secured by a quotation from Churchill with 
whom Cameron thus aligns himself). In naming the EU as a historical achievement, 
the work of generations, the point is not, however, to celebrate collective effort but to 
locate the EU in the category of things which can be changed if we want to change 
them. And this is connected to the next claim Cameron makes: that the EU faces a 
  20 
new challenge in the form of competitors in the ‘global race’ for economic develop-
ment and so must change through more determined work.  
 
In the next section Cameron announces the character, ‘the spirit’, with which he ap-
proaches the matters at hand. In so doing he makes an ethos – that of the UK - an ex-
plicit object of consideration, something to be explained to the EU. His own ethos, 
then, is that of both advocate and representative of the British character and perhaps 
also that of an honest broker simply explaining to the EU how it is. For the character 
of the UK is – in contrast to the EU – not a man-made and changeable thing. It is a 
fixed point. It is a fact. It is a necessary premise. Because Britain is as it is, certain 
things simply must follow. The UK, he says is seen as ‘argumentative, rather strong-
minded’ and this can be ascribed to the facts of geography shaping facts of psycholo-
gy: ‘We have the character of an island nation - independent, forthright, passionate in 
defence of our sovereignty’. To make the point unambiguous he adds: ‘we can no 
more change this British sensibility than we can drain the English Channel’. British-
ness is immovable. It cannot be changed so don’t try. The EU can be changed and it 
must. These claims are then filled out and Britishness is (catachrestically) made into 
the name of certain virtues: ‘a frame of mind that is more practical than emotional’, 
seeing the EU as a means to an end, always asking down-to-earth empirical questions 
‘How? Why? To what end?’. The UK is declared a ‘European power’ - but that is not 
the same as being European.  
 
The evidence provided to substantiate these claims about Britishness is very striking: 
‘From Caesar’s legions to the Napoleonic Wars. From the Reformation, the Enlight-
enment and the Industrial Revolution to the defeat of Nazism. We have helped to 
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write European history, and Europe has helped write ours’. These are military events, 
listed in a way which distinguishes between a monolithic Europe and a singular UK. 
The latter has made a ‘unique contribution’ to the former. It has been ‘…a haven to 
those fleeing tyranny and persecution’. In wartime ‘we helped keep the flame of liber-
ty alight. Across the continent, in silent cemeteries, lie the hundreds of thousands of 
British servicemen who gave their lives for Europe’s freedom’. There are further ref-
erences to the end of Communism and British advocacy of expansion into Eastern Eu-
rope. This list forms part of a premise to a conclusion about ‘our national character, 
our attitude to Europe’: that ‘Britain is characterised not just by its independence but, 
above all, by its openness’. The implication that this is in contrast with the rest of the 
EU is made explicit by reference to a Britain which reaches out and which (more mili-
tary metaphors) ‘leads the charge in the fight’ for global trade and against protection-
ism.  
 
In these passages, then, Cameron defines an ethos of Britishness to which his auditors 
in the EU ought to defer given how uniquely placed Britain is, by nature and as evi-
denced by history, to ask the ‘difficult questions’ and to show the EU how to change 
itself and embrace openness. This is – it surely goes without saying – an extraordinary 
way to construct an appeal intended to win over the audience of those within the EU. 
It is unashamedly arrogant and disrespectful towards its audience. Why, then, does he 
do it? There are, I think, three things going on here.  
 
In the first place, this is in fact the ethos of a certain ideology of British Conservatism; 
that is to say, the arrogance is real and the British-centrism of the analysis indicative 
of a way of thinking. Sometimes political figures make misjudgements and this may 
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be evidence of one of them. However, and in the second place, these aspects of the 
speech are also demonstrations of that ethos in action and aimed at others in the Con-
servative Party so as to cultivate Cameron’s own authority and legitimacy to act as 
their representative. He is invoking a series of commonplaces from within the doxa of 
British Conservative Euroscepticism. Indeed, the passages are in fact a clear echo of 
Margaret Thatcher’s’ definitive ‘Bruges Speech’ – the urtext of Conservative Euro-
scepticism. She began that speech by declaring Britain just as much an heir to Euro-
pean culture as any other European nation and, as Cameron did twenty-five years lat-
er, with a list of historical references: ‘For three hundred years, we were part of the 
Roman Empire and our maps still trace the straight lines of the roads the Romans 
built. Our ancestors—Celts, Saxons, Danes—came from the Continent’. She went on 
to mention Norman and Angevin rule, the glorious revolution and William of Orange. 
Here too historical events were connected to a proof of British virtues. Thatcher de-
scribed Britain as ‘pioneering’ representative government and expressed pride for ‘the 
way in which for centuries Britain was a home for people from the rest of Europe who 
sought sanctuary from tyranny’. She also eulogized Britain’s ‘very special way’ of 
contributing to Europe: ‘Over the centuries we have fought to prevent Europe from 
falling under the dominance of a single power. We have fought and we have died for 
her freedom’. She went on to speak of British support for resistance movements, the 
mounting of the liberation of Europe ‘from our island fortress’ and of the need to de-
fend the freedom of those in Eastern Europe (at that time, of course, still part of the 
Warsaw Pact). Cameron’s list of historic events is not exactly the same as Thatcher’s 
- the resonance of hers is far richer and subtler. But the presence of such a list and its 
connection to claims about virtuous national character are clearly part of a common-
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place. Perhaps by so conforming to Tory common sense Cameron hoped also to 
demonstrate his Tory credentials.   
  
But there is a third dimension to what Cameron is doing with all this. In the speech 
his self-declared ethos is that of one who does not want to ‘pull up the drawbridge’, is 
not ‘a British isolationist’ and who has a vision. That vision again involves seeing the 
things which can be changed and which aren’t natural. For example, ‘labour market 
regulations are not some naturally occurring phenomenon’. In the closing sections of 
the speech the British people are described as a single and unified object on the field 
of political calculation: ‘People feel that the EU is heading in a direction that they 
never signed up to. They resent the interference in our national life by what they see 
as unnecessary rules and regulation. And they wonder what the point of it all is. Put 
simply, many ask “why can’t we just have what we voted to join – a common mar-
ket?”’ Here the British  – with their character as natural as the English channel – are a 
limit on Cameron’s own action and so the source of an obligation for the EU to act. 
They are a premise around which reasoning must be organised. We may think that 
Britain’s position creates uncertainty ‘But the question mark is already there and ig-
noring it won’t make it go away’. This becomes a justification for Cameron’s position 
and a reason why the EU needs to change. Danger to the EU, Cameron has earlier 
said, comes not from those who believe in change but from ‘those who denounce new 
thinking as heresy. In its long history Europe has experience of heretics who turned 
out to have a point’. This is rather dramatic – but that Cameron is casting himself and 
his country in that role is clear. He goes on to articulate his ideas with a marked in-
crease in uses of personal pronouns: ‘my vision’, ‘I want us’, ‘I would ask’ and so on. 
Cameron’s vision, then, is born of his unique perspicacity which is a product of his 
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Britishness but also consists of the fact that he can see the fixed nature of Britishness 
and thus instruct the rest of the EU to wise-up and start thinking about how to adapt to 
a new and changed world. 
 
There are other parts to this speech which are extremely interesting. In particular a 
section at the end addresses the British people, urging rejection of a no vote in a puta-
tive referendum using the classic forms of reactionary argument identified by 
Hirschmann (1991) - futility, perversity and jeopardy: we are so intertwined we can’t 
really leave; the UK would end up with less power and subject to EU rules anyway; 
there is a risk of losing power. In this way Cameron developed a conservative case for 
remaining in the EU: to leave would be a rash disruption of the status quo. Similar 
arguments would be used in the actual referendum campaign in 2016. The failure of 
that campaign is, I think, foreshadowed in this speech (although, of course, the per-
spicacity of hindsight is easy to demonstrate). Before Cameron could make his Con-
servative case for Remain he decided he had to develop the ethos of a credible Euro-
sceptic and in this speech gave centre stage to fundamentally Eurosceptic premises: 
that Britain is distinct from its European partners, uniquely hard-headed and con-
cerned with its own interests – naturally so in fact. In constituting that attitude as a 
given, as natural and unchangeable, something the EU really ought to just recognize 
and accept, Cameron was dancing with doxa but, following rather than leading the 
steps, he was always dancing to someone else’s tune. When the music stopped it was 
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In this chapter I have tried to explain as best I can the context out of which people like 
me think about language in politics. In doing so I have emphasised what is specific to 
that thinking, contrasting RPA with schools such as CDA and CDS. I have left to one 
side the many and important things which are shared in common. In particular I have 
stressed a focus upon contestation of political language as well as decontestation, with 
a particular emphasis on the ways in which the use of concepts can be constrained by 
historical context or tradition (although the space for new actions is never entirely cir-
cumscribed). In looking at instances of rhetoric we are looking at moves in ongoing 
debates and looking for the ways in which thinking is being manifested, shaped and 
reshaped. In a brief discussion of Cameron’s Bloomberg speech we saw that a central 
concept within it was that of Britishness. At times this was deployed catachrestically 
as a name for an ethos, a set of virtues and capacities and a way of thinking. Cameron 
tried to use that name as a premise in a deduction the conclusions of which were at 
once that Europe should change and that the UK should stay in the EU. But he could 
not make that argument hold in part because he subordinated it to his short-term need 
to keep his party opponents quiet. In promoting a concept of Britishness central to the 
doxa of his opponents he failed to challenge or rework that doxa and found himself 
trapped within it. When the actual referendum came around that idea of Britain be-
longed to the Leave camp and Cameron found himself – unsurprisingly – on the los-
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